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The Employment Contracts Act 1991: an 
employers' charter? 
Gordon Anderson• 
The Employment ~Contracts Act 1991 radically alters the system of labour law in 
New Zealand by movi~g its focus from the collective to the individual level, and the 
locus from the industry or occupation to the individual .employing enterprise. At 
the same time, the Act significantly shifts the balance of bargaining power further 
towards employers. The Act also alters the nature of labour law in 2 significant 
ways: it abandons the system of registered awards enforceable in their own right 
and instead opts for enforcement .through the law of contract, albeit with separate 
procedures, and it brings all employment contracts within the new regime. This 
article covers the nature of the change.s to the bargaining system and the 
implications of mov,ing to a labour law reg.ime based entirely on contract. \1 
1. Introduction 
'The Employment ·Contracts Act 1991 is the most radical refo1na of New Zealand's 
labour law and its system of industrial relations since the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1894 first introduced the system of compulsory arbitration. The Act not 
only overturns the last of the premises that underpinned the 1894 legislation but, in 
addition, largely runs counter to the pluralist premises that have underlaid industrial 
relations in the majority of developed countries for most of this century, particularly 
since the end of the Second World War. The Employment Contracts A~ct also makes a 
sharp break from the trends in labour law reform that began in 1970 and which reached 
their peak in the Labour Relations Act 1987. During that period it became apparent that 
the system of compulsory arbitration which had dominated the law since 1894 was 
becoming increasingly anachronistic and was, in practice, giving way to a system of 
direct collective bargaining at an industry, enterprise and occupational level but which 
took place, for the most part, within the legal framework of the conciliation and 
arbitration system. The Labour Relations Act completed the process of amending the law 
to recognize these changes. It also brought other aspects of the law, such as strike law 
and the limits on the scope of bargaining, into harmony with a collective bargaining 
system (Anderson, 1990). 
The Employment Contracts Act shifts the focus of labour law away from a system 
based on the collective representation of the interests of workers and the recognition of 
the inherent inequality of bargaining power in the employment relationship, to one that 
stresses the primacy of the freedom of choice of individual workers in their relationships 
with their own employers. The central theme of the new legislation is to locate the 
centre of labour law and the employment relationship at the level of the individual worker 
within the enterprise in which the ·work~er is employed, and to move collective 
organizations to a peripheral role. 
This article focuses on 2 aspects of the Employment Contracts Act, the changed 
nature of bargaining and the role of trade unions, and the change to a contract based 
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system of labour law. It is not, however, intended to discuss the law relating to contracts 
of employment in depth and the article will instead concentrate on the broader aspects of 
the changes. First, however, it is useful to briefly consider the capture of the policy and 
political debate by employer organizations in the period leading up to the Act and the 
ideological impetus behind the Act. 
2. The political and ideological dimension 
As described above, New Zealand labour law has undergone considerable change over 
the past 2 decades. For much of that period the refottns were largely agreed between the 2 
peak organizations, the Employers Federation and the Federation of Labour. This was 
particularly true of the major refot1ns in the Industrial Relations Act 1973, and continued 
to be the rule until about 1985. The abolition of compulsory arbitration in 1984 was 
agreed in a committee where both organizations were represented. The debate leading up 
to the Labour Relations Act 1987, however, made it clear that the past pattern of 
consensus-based reform was no longer feasible. The Employers Federation adopted a 
position that was not only likely to be repugnant to the union movement, but which 
increasingly viewed unions as anachronistic and marginal to good industrial relations. 
This position was one facet of the general trend towards the extremist New Right 
libertarian economic theory that was increasingly adopted by both the Labour 
Government and by business interests in the period after 1984. These views were most 
strongly propounded by the Business Roundtable, an organization consisting of the chief 
executives of many of New Zealand's larger companies. It was the Roundtable that first 
advocated the type of reforms that were to foun the basis of the Employment Contracts 
Act and which was prominent in lobbying for the refotnts. The Roundtable also provided 
their theoretical justification. This was heavily influenced by such writers as Hayek and 
Richard Epstein I and stressed freedom of contract and the essentially simplistic view that 
the general law of contract is sufficient to regulate employment relationships (Brook, 
1990). A contrary view of the efficacy of contract law is that "the common law of 
contract as developed by the Judges has proved demonstrably inadequate to do reasonable 
justice" (Cooke, 1990, p.2). The Employers Federation were initially slow to adopt the 
New Right agenda, but after changes to the organization's leadership in 1989 (The 
Dominion, 13 October 1989), it became increasingly supportive of it. The extent to 
which the Federation's leadership fully represented the views of all its members, 
especially smaller employers, is a matter of some debate as there is clear evidence that a 
significant number of employers were reasonably happy with the existing system 
(McAndrew and Hursthouse, 1991). 
Although the Labour Government had adopted much of the policy of the New Right 
between 1984 and 1990, it had not applied these policies to the labour market. This was 
seen as an anomaly by those supporting such policies who regarded the labour market as 
the remaining major barrier to their programme. The election of a National government 
in 1990 reopened the possibility for major structural refotans in the labour market and the 
Government was quick to signal that it saw no place for significant legislative 
involvement in setting employment standards. One of the :first acts of the new 
Government was to repeal the Employment Equity Act 1990 arguing that legislation was 
unnecessary to bring about employment equity for women in the labour market. Refonn 
of the labour market had been signaled as a priority in the National Party's election 
manifesto. The manifesto indicated plans to reform the labour market, but both the 
manifesto and statements by party spokespersons failed to disclose the full extent of the 
1 Epstein visited New Zealand in 1990 as part of the campaign in favour of labour law reform 
and against employment equity legislation. 
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proposed changes. The impetus for reform was no doubt also fuelled by Treasury's desire 
to see cuts in the level of real wages (The Treasury, 1990). 
The Employment Contracts Bill reflected the ability of the Employers Federation and 
Business Roundtable and their allies to capture the policy making initiative within the 
National Party and to isolate not only the union movement but to a large extent the 
Department of Labour from that process. An article by Alastair Morrison (The 
Dominion, 5 April 1991) details the capture of the policy and drafting process by the 
New Right not only in the Employers Federation and the Roundtable, but also within the 
Government, especially by 'Treasury and the State Services Commission. A 
memorandum prepared at the time of the draft Bill states that there has been "infot1nal" 
consultation with the Employers Federation, but that the "NZ Council of Trade Unions 
and workers ... have not been consulted."2 Perhaps the ,Government had come to agree 
with the Employers Federation that "Society, though, has moved past [the] stage" when 
unions were needed to assist workers (The Employer, February 1991), and thus they need 
not be consulted. 
This impression was given weight by the process by which the Act was passed, 
which can usefully be compared with Lhe process that preceded the Labour Relations Act 
in 1987. The latter Act was preceded first by a govem.ment green paper (Department of 
Labour, 1985) and then a long period of public debate before the introduction of a Bill. 
The Bill itself was also the subject of considerable debate. In total contrast, the 
Employment Contracts Bill was introduced with little prior debate and it was made clear 
that no substantial changes would be made 'to the policies in the Bill. On being reported 
back from the select committee the Bill was immediately rushed through Parliament 
under urgency, a dubious legislative procedure at best. Given the importance of the 
legislation and the substantial and important changes that were introduced by the select 
committee, one can only be amazed by the legislative procedures and must seriously 
question the commitment to participative democracy by the government and other 
supporters of the Bill. At a practical level the rushed procedure has resulted in an Act that 
is poorly thought through in legal terms and which contains glaring ambiguities and 
inconsistencies. Already there has been one amendment to the Act 
3. The Employment C~ontracts Act: an overview 
Before discussing particular aspects of the legislation it is worth pausing to consider, 
in broad tet n1s, the structure of law that the Act has implemented, particularly in the light 
of the above discussion on the aims of employer organizations. The success of these 
organizations is most apparent in the provisions relating to freedom of association and 
the structure of the bargaining process which fundamentally reorientate New Zealand's 
labour law. Sinc,e 1894 labour law has tended to transmit employment rights through the 
medium of a trade union rather than by conferring directly enforceable benefits on 
individual work,ers. A worker's union has been not only the legal v,ehi,cle for the 
representation of the worker in arbitration, and latterly in collective bargaining, but it has 
also been regarded as the body through which the rights of individual workers are 
enforced. This Iauer role was strengLhened by the Labour Relations Act 1987 at the same 
time as the enforcement role of the Department of Labour was substantially reduced. 
Prior to the Employment Contracts Act, a trade union enjoyed statutory monopoly 
bargaining rights in respect of all workers within its membership rule, a position that 
was strengthened in many cases, especially in private sector employment, by a de facto 
compulsory membership provision. Workers thus had no effective choice as to who 
2 Memorandum from R. Stockdill, Department of Labour, to the Minister of Labour, 3 
December 1990. 
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would represent them in collective bargaining.3 The same is ttue of the rights of workers 
not to be unjustifiably dismissed. While workers enjoyed this right it was their union 
that had the right to initiate, or to refuse to initiate, the procedure to enforce that right 
(Hughes, 1989, para. 4.90 and 4.105). 
The Employment Contracts Act has now shifted the focus of labour law to the 
individual worker. Individual workers are now free to choose whether or not they wish to 
be represented in negotiations with their employer, and are also allowed a much wider 
choice of bargaining repr~esentative, of which trade unions are only one possibility. The 
Act has also given individual workers responsibility for enforcing their own employment 
rights, aln1ough again there is the right to do this through a representative. The role that 
unions retain in labour Ia w is as one agent of choice of individual workers rather than as 
the centre piece of the industrial relations system. It is the focus of the Employment 
Contracts Act on the individual worker that is perhaps the most important for the future 
of labour law. Although the motives for this reorientation and the for1n in which it has 
been achieved are clearly designed not to promote individual rights but to de-unionize the 
workforce, it is difficult to see how (or indeed why) any future refoun of labour law will 
significantly reverse this individual orientation. This remains true even if collective 
organization and collective bargaining are to be again encouraged and promoted and the 
legislation strengthened to this end. 
Against the greater freedom given to individual workers must be set the attempt of 
the Act to marginalize trade unions as actors in the industrial relations process. While 
the Act has allowed workers the freedom to choose their own representatives it has, at the 
same time, enacted a regime that severely limits the ability of those workers to organize 
effectively in collective organizations to protect and promote their interests. The Act, in 
total contrast to all legislation since 1894, does not recognize or refer to trade unions. It 
has also largely removed the legal ability of trade unions to gain access to their members 
in a workplace for organizational purposes and places no requirement on an employer to 
recognize the union or to bargain with it regardless of the number of employees 
represented by the union. 
The second significant change brought about by the Act is the abandonment of the 
statutory procedures for the negotiation, registration and enforcement of collective 
agreements and their replacement by employment contracts that will be governed by and 
enforced largely on normal contractual principles. This change was one strongly 
advocated by adherents of the New Right But as one of the central arguments of the New 
Right was that a contract of employment was no different from any other contract, and 
should thus be enforceable through the ordinary courts and on normal contractual 
principles, the form of this change is disappointing to those advocating it Brook (1991). 
The Employment Contracts Act has not only created a specialist tribunal and retained 
a specialist court, which now have jurisdiction over most aspects of the law of 
employment, but it continues to subject employment relationships to a specialized legal 
regime that retains many features of the earlier law. Indeed the Act not only fetains those 
features, but has extended them to all employment contracts including individual contracts 
of employment previously governed by the ordinary law of contract and which were 
enforceable in the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. While the future shape of labour law is 
difficult to predict, one can see in the Employment Contracts Act the potential emergence 
of an autonomous system of labour law that will be rooted in contract but in time will 
develop its own individual character. 
3 See Anderson, 1986, for the acceptability of these provisions in international labour law. 
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4. The bargaining system 
The most dramatic changes that are brought about by the Act are those relating to 
collective bargaining. In essence the Act removes state support for collective bargaining 
and considerably increa~ the power of employers to either refuse to bargain or to control 
the course of bargaining that they agree to. This is achieved by reducing the ability of 
workers to organize collectively and in reducing the powers and rights that collective 
organizations have to act on behalf of their members. The priority of the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 was on the collective settlement of terms and conditions of 
employment. The Employment Contract Act's focus is on the agreement of terms 
between an employer and employee at the enterprise level, and as such has placed 
considerable obstacles in the way of collective bargaining and especially multi-employer 
bargaining. 
v 
Trade unions and ~collective organization 
Since 1894 unions have been central to the system of law that supported New 
Zealand industrial relations and especially to the arbitration system. The 1894 Act 
r~equired that the interests of workers be properly represented in conciliation and before the 
Court of Arbitration. For this reason the legislation granted considerable privileges to 
unions that register~ed under the .Act including monopoly representation rights for workers 
within the union's membership rule. The statutory establishment and recognition of 
unions was, however, bought at a price. Unions were seen as creatures of the state and 
their functions were to a significant extent subordinated to its purposes. That unions 
were seen in this light was ~exemplified by the government's power to deregister unions., 
and thus to effectively destroy them by administrative fiat (Roth, 1986). This role was, 
however, usually acc·epted by unions in return for the privileges granted by the state. 
This position has however changed over the last 2 decades as unions have adopted what 
has been teuned a mobilizational model of organization (Brosnan et ,a/., 1990, p.98-101). 
Nevertheless, legally, unions have remained within a statutory structure specifically 
Cfeated for them as part of labour legislation. Indeed, state unions, which had previously 
operated outside the statutory system, were brought within it in 1988. By that time, 
however, the Labour R~elations Act had removed most of the legislative restrictions on 
union objects. 
The Employment ~Contracts Act redefines the role of trade unions in the industrial 
relations syste.m and significantly downgrades their legal status, a change which it is 
difficult to see as other than an exercise in marginalizing ·their role. The view that unions 
are to be marginalized is supported by the total absence of references to unions in the Act. 
The Act does refer to an entity called an "employee organization" which is defined as a 
body "which exists in whole or in part to further the employment interests of the 
employees belonging to it" (s. 2). Such bodies do not, however., enjoy any particular 
rights under the Act. Unions are now tr~eated as just one of a number of choices open to 
individual ·workers as their representatives and their unique role of collectiv.ely improving 
and pfotecting the interests of workers is disregarded, if not actively hampered. This 
means, of course, that the ability of unions to survive and carry out their traditional role 
will depend on their ability to attract and retain members and to act effectively on their 
behalf. This will require at least some acceptance of a collective ethos by their 
membership. This task is one that many unions in New Zealand have rarely had to face 
and may involv~e some in th.e rapid learning of a basic union function. The ability of 
unions to undertake this task has, however, been severely undeunined by the provisions 
of the Employment Contracts Act. 
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Union structures Prior to 1991 unions were registered under and derived their 
legal status from the provisions of the Labour Relations Act. These provisions included 
controls on the rules and procedures of unions to ensure their accountability to their 
members. The new Act has no such provisions and all existing unions are deemed to be 
incorporated societies and have been re-registered under the provisions of the Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908. This Act is not necessarily entirely suitable for the effective legal 
structuring of a union. Unlike the Labour Relations Act, the Incorporated Societies Act 
has no special provisions regulating the rules of unions and in particular no provisions 
that will protect union members against undemocratic rules or actions. Presumably such 
democratic controls are of no concern in the new model of industrial relations in which 
members will use their new found freedom of choice to leave undemocratic unions. 
Unfortunately the historical and comparative record is not so sanguine and members are 
unlikely to have the resources to sue their union or to organize alternatives. Insofar as 
any body is recognized as representing workers, that body is the employee's representative 
and that representative may be either an organization or an individual. If the 
representative is an organization there is no requirement that it possess any of the 
characteristics of a workers organization such as that it not be "under the domination of 
employers or employers' organizations" (International Labour Office (ILO) Convention 
98). 
The right to organize For a union to be able to organize effectively it must 
have access to potential members and be able to gain recognition from employers as the 
legitimate representative of its members. Ideally, the law should encourage and promote 
these needs and limit interference in their exercise, a principle that is central to ILO 
Convention 98.4 This has been one of the traditional functions of New Zealand labour 
law, one that was taken to excess in the monopoly rights that were granted to unions. 
The Employment Contracts Act makes no pretence at promoting collective organization. 
If anything it hinders it and will make it increasingly difficult for unions to organize, 
especially as unions lose what advantage they have from an existing membership. Even 
the minimal freedom of association provisions that remain are objectionable to some 
New Right adherents who criticize them as restricting competition (Brook, 1991, p.8). 
Presumably Brook shares Hayek's view that the activities and powers of unions "require 
limitations by general rules of law far more narrow than those it has been found necessary 
to impose by law on the actions of private individuals" (Hayek, 1979, p.96). 
The Act will only allow unions a right of access to their members once they have 
been authorized to act as their representative in negotiations for an employment contract, 
and then only "to discuss matters with that employee regarding those negotiations" (s. 14 
(1)). The Act docs state that union officials may "with the agreement of the employer" 
(s. 13) be given access for the purpose of obtaining authorities, but there is nothing to 
stop an employer refusing such access. The Act thus allows only limited rights of access 
during negotiations, and that right is written in terms of access to the individual worker 
and not to the group that the union may represent. It is also notable that a representative 
has no on-going rights of access to enforce the contract when authorized to do so by the 
worker. All other rights of access will depend on the union's ability to negotiate such 
rights during negotiations for an employment contract. 
The Act will make union organization extremely difficult, especially when the union 
faces employer hostility. The Act contains few protections against employers abusing 
their dominant economic position and their privileged access to workers to manipulate the 
way in which the workforce is organized. Section 7 prohibits preference in a contract or 
other arrangement on the basis of membership or non-membership of an employee's 
organization and section 8 prohibits undue influence in relation to various matters 
4 New Zealand has not ratified either Convention 87 (Freedom of Association and the Right 
to Organise) or 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining). 
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including membership of organizations. The personal grievance provisions also contain 
some protection for workers in that both "discrimination" (s. 28) and "duress" (s. 30) 
include anti-union activities. Proof of such activities is however extremely difficult and 
the penalties minimal. The way thus seems open for employers to have the dominant 
influence in the majority of enterprises in dictating the fot1n of representation of workers. 
The choices range from "making the union irrelevant", (as one major employer has stated 
as being its aim), through house unions to recognizing one or more existing unions. 
In some cases, this may only mean a rationalization of the bargaining structure, but 
in the short period since the Act came into force there is increasing evidence that 
employers are prepared to use their daily access to workers to counter union organizing 
activities and to attempt to isolate the union from its members. This includes such 
tactics as cif!culating standard fo1 na resignation letters and attempting to persuade workers 
to nominate named union delegates or officials as repr~esentatives rather than the union. 
The latter tactic is presumably intended to limit access as much as possible and to 
undernaine the role that the union ~can play. It also appears that some employers may be 
using their daily contact with workers to attempt to sidestep the worker's representative 
and to attempt to isolate and negotiate directly with the worker concerned. This seems to 
have occurred even where the worker has appointed the union as their representative and 
the employer has agreed to bargain with the union. 
Bargaining structures 
The greatest contrast that the Employment Contracts Act provides with all labour 
legislation since 1894 is that the provisions relating to collective bargaining are 
minimaL Since 1894, legislation has stipulated the procedures for bargaining and the 
structure of the resulting agreements in great detail. The Employment Contracts A~ct 
provides that the type of bargaining and the form of the resulting contracts are a matter 
for negotiation between an employer and its ~employees. The Act provides that workers 
may choose to bargain collectively but neither requires or ~encourages th~e employer to 
agree to this. 
Recognition 
One of the greatest weaknesses of the Act from the perspective of both workers and 
unions is that there are no procedures to require an employer to recognize any union, let 
alone a majority union, nor to bargain with a union or any other workers' representativ~e. 
The only obligation is that an employer .must recognize the "authority" of a worker's 
repr~esentative (s. 12(2)). What, if anything, such recognition involves is not stated and 
litigation will be needed to clarify the law. An immediate issue is whether an employer 
is still free to negotiate directly with a worker where a third party has been authorized to 
represent that worker. Should an ~employer refuse to recognize a union for bargaining 
purposes the union's only alternative would seem to be to resort to strike action. An 
employer may however be able to avoid this in some ~cases by taking advantage of the 
new provisions on the legitimacy of strikes. These are discussed in detail below, but 2 
obvious techniques would be lo attempt to induce workers to agr~ee to a collective !contract 
by going behind the union or by using the prohibition against strikes over multi-
employer ~contracts. The frrst technique, in particular, is feasible if workers are unawwe 
that they are entering such a contract or are not aware of the implications of doing so . 
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The right to strike 
One of the significant advances in the Labour Relations Act was the establishment of 
a clear legal right to strike, a major improvement on the confused situation that existed 
prior to 1987 when strikes in most situations were unlawful, either at common law or by 
statute (Anderson, 1987). The provisions of the Labour Relations Act have been 
discussed in detail elsewhere (Hughes, 1989, ch. 11) and need not be covered in detail 
here. Basically the Labour Relations Act granted immunity from actions founded on the 
economic torts when a strike was "lawful" as defined by the Act. In general tern as a 
strike was lawful if it related to a dispute of interest and there was either no existing 
award or agreement, or the existing award or agreement was within 60 days of its expiry 
date. In the case of such strikes the Act placed no bar on secondary or sympathy action. 
Strikes were also permitted over redundancy disputes, but the right to strike in such cases 
was confined to the workers to whom the agreement would apply. 
The Employment Contracts Act has not totally negated these gains but it has 
considerably restricted the scope for lawful strikes and has the potential to make strike 
action ineffective for the majority of New Zealand workers. The 2 most significant 
restrictions introduced by the Act are that to be lawful a strike must "relate to the 
negotiation of a collective contract for the employees concerned" (s. 64(1)(b)) and it may 
not be concerned with the issue of whether a collective contract will bind more than one 
employer (s. 63(e)). These restrictions will have the effect of increasingly isolating the 
unit that is pet rnitted to take lawful strike action by preventing sympathy or secondary 
action, thus allowing employers to take a much more aggressive approach to strikers. 
Prior to this Act, employers would have found it difficult to dismiss strikers as most 
lawful strikes were organized on an industry or occupational basis and an organized 
secondary response was possible if an employer dismissed strikers. The new law will 
make it increasingly difficult for unions to provide support for dismissed strikers and 
employers will find it correspondingly easier to either replace or to rehire strikers on 
teuns dictated by the employer. The bar on strikes over whether a collective contract will 
bind more than one employer will also benefit employers. Small employers will be able 
to isolate their workforce and defeat strikes even if the difficulties of organizing a strike in 
such situations are overcome. Larger employers may now be able to break their business 
into smaller units, each of which is a separate company and hence a separate employer. 
This technique was used with some success in the United Kingdom (Wedderburn, 1986, 
p.555-557 and 597-605). It would then be possible to isolate small groups of workers 
within an enterprise unless the courts are prepared to pierce the corporate veil and take 
account of the reality of capitalist corporate structures rather than its legal for na. 
A further potential limitation on the right to strike in some circumstances will be if 
an employer is able to persuade its employees to sign a collective contract with an expiry 
date which extends the contract for an unreasonable period of time. This may be possible 
where there is no independent representation as many employees may be unaware of the 
consequences of signing such a document. 
The Employment Contracts Act may also have opened a potential door for collective 
contracts to be challenged where they have been entered into following a strike. Section 
57 allows the Court to set aside a contract (in whole or in part) or to award compensation 
where the Court is satisfied that "the employment contract, or any part of it, was procured 
by harsh and oppressive behaviour or by undue influence or duress." This provision 
would seem clearly to encompass a contract, or more likely in practice a variation of 
contract, obtained as the result of an unlawful strike, such action almost certainly being 
held to involve both duress and harsh and oppressive behaviour. In the Universe 
Tankships case (1982) the House of Lords applied the rules relating to duress to allow 
the recovery of monies paid in the course of an industrial dispute and indicated that 
industrial action that was not protected by statute could be held to amount to duress 
(p.75-77). 
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More worrying is whether a lawful strike could be held to amount to duress or to be 
harsh and oppressive. If so, even lawful strike action will face an additional ex post facto 
obstacle in that a court might see itself as free to decide on the legitimacy of particular 
types of strike action or whether the object of the strike sought by the workers involved 
is justified in ter nas of the economic damage caused to an employer in obtaining it. In 
resolving this question a court would need to tak·e into account that there is a clear 
statutory policy that strikes are lawful in certain circumstances. Lawfulness does not, 
however, mean that there is legal immunity from all the legal consequences of a strike, it 
merely prevents an action based on the economic torts or founded on a breach of contract. 
An action based on either duress or harsh and oppressive conduct is not within the 
immunities provided. It is worth recalling that the English Court of Appeal was tempted 
to inquir·e into the reasonableness of strike action (Ewing, 1979) before being reined in by 
the "graceless intervention" (Ewing, 1986, p . 145) of the House of Lords on the eve of the 
Thatcherite restrictions on unions in that country. In New Zealand there is now the 
potential for a similar development. 
5. Th~e new employment law 
The Employm~ent Contracts Act has implemented a major restructuring of the law of 
employment and in particular has legally and procedurally unified the 2 systems of law 
that co-existed before the Acl The Act has repealed the provisions of the previous law 
which provided a statutory system for the fegistration and enforceability of collectively 
negotiated documents and now requir~es that such documents be enforced as contracts. 
Equally importantly, all employment contracts are now brought within the sam~e legal 
regime, as the Act applies to all contracts of employment including the substantial 
proportion of ~contracts that previously w~ere governed solely by the law of contract and 
which were within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The impact of these changes is 
potentially far reaching as employment law will now develop in relation to all contracts 
of employment and the law to be applied will be that set out in the Act as interpr·eted by 
a specialist Employment Court. While the Act applies the ordinary law of ~contract to all 
contracts of employment there ar~e modifications of that law in the Act and no doubt the 
decisions reached under the Act will in time come to increasingly reflect the special 
jurisdiction of the Employment Court. 
lt is, of course, true that lab<Jur law has always contained a strong component of 
contract law. The ~employment relationship has always had a contract at its heart, even if 
the mor~e important tetans w~ere fixed by an award or agreement. For the .many ·workers 
falling outside the collectively organized workforce the law of contract fotaned the total 
basis of their employment r~elationship. In com.mon law systems it has, however, been 
unusual for collective agreements to be regarded as contracts. The common law position 
adopted in Ford Motor Co v AUEW (1969) and followed in New Zealand in Re Andrew 
Patterson Ltd (1981) is that collective agreements are presumed to lack ·contractual 
intention and are thus not binding on the parti ~es. These decisions can, how~ever, be 
criticized and of course the presumption can be rebutted (Hughes, 1989 pam. 10.440-445). 
The terms in such an agreement could also become binding between an employer and 
employee by becoming incorporated into the individual contract. In both Australia and 
New Zealand, ·the system of registered awards and agreements meant that the legal 
position of collective agree.ments was in most cases of little importance as legal 
~enforceability derived from the relevant statute rather than the law of contract. Following 
the Employment Contracts Act the position in New Zealand must now be reassessed. 
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'The scope of the Employment Contracts Act 
Section 3 of the Act states that: 
This Act shall apply to all employment contracts and the Tribunal and Court 
shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have exclusive jurisdiction to hear 
and determine any proceedings founded on an employment contract. 
An employment contract is defined as a "contract of service" (s. 2), although there is 
also an extended definition to cover contracts for services between an employer and a 
hom~eworker. The definition of an employment contract will raise inevitable 
jurisdictional problems as to whether a contract is or is not an employment contract and 
hence whether a dispute comes within the Act or falls within the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary courts. This may cause inconvenience to the parties but the principles on which 
the issue is dcte11nined are well known, if not always easy to apply (Hughes, 1989, ch. 
1). The effect is, however, clear. The Employment Contracts Act sets up a single legal 
regime which will apply to all employment contracts and in so doing stresses a basic 
theme of the Act. No longer will there be a special law for collective employment 
relationships. All employment relationships will now be legally equal with an emphasis 
on the individual contract. 
The Act does, however, distinguish between individual and collective employment 
contracts, the fot111er being binding " on only one employer and one employee" and the 
latter binding "one or .more employers and 2 or more employees" (s. 2). An employees' 
representative, may, with the agreement of the parties, become a party to an employment 
contract. The Act does not however recognize the concept of a collective agreement in 
the sense of an agreement purely between a union and an employer even if that agreement 
sets teuns and conditions of work. Again the object seems clearly to be to marginalize 
both unions and the concept of collective bargaining as a primary influence in labour law. 
Labour law or employment law? While the Act has brought together all 
actions founded on an employment contract, it cannot be said to have created a single 
body of employment law. Harrison (1991, p.42) makes the point that a single dispute 
may involve the need to bring an action in both the Employment Court and the ordinary 
courts. Harrison gives as one example the facts of SSC & B Lintas v Murphy (1986), a 
case involving a senior employee leaving his employer, taking with him co-employees 
and documents and files belonging to the employer, and setting up a rival business. The 
case involved claims in both tort (inducement to breach of contract and conversion) and 
for breach of contract. It would seem that this case would have to be decided in the High 
Court as regards the tort action and the Employment Tribunal or Court as regards breach 
of contract. 
A more serious issue, however, is that even a contractual relationship ·with clear 
industrial relations implications may fall outside the Act as not being a contract of 
employment. An employment contract is defined as a "contract of service." This means 
that the primary parties in terms of the Act must be an employer and an employee. If 
not, the contract will not be a contract of employment and thus ·will fall outside the Act. 
It follows that any contract between a union (or indeed any employee representative) and 
an employer is not a contract of employment and is thus outside the jurisdiction conferred 
on the Tribunal and the Court. Such an agreement it would need to be enforced outside 
the provisions of the Act. If so, the legal status of such agreements could be an issue of 
contention, especially as, following the Act, such agreements arc likely to be infonual 
and ad hoc. It is, however, unlikely that unions would use other than a collective 
employment contract in any matter of substance, so staying within the familiar 
jurisdiction and procedures of the Act. The effect is, however, that a useful contractual 
framework is likely to be denied the participants in collective bargaining. The definition 
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legal basis as ordinary workers when it would have been better to encompass the Act as a 
whole in this description. 
The structure of the employment relationship 
The Employment Contracts Act envisages that an employer and employee will be 
bound by an individual employment contract or by a collective contract although it 
allows room for a combination of both. The only constraint is that the individual 
contract may not be "inconsistent" with an applicable collective contract (s. 19(2)). 
Where there is a collective contract some difficulties may arise. A collective contract 
must be in writing and must have an expiry date. By its nature it will also be a 
collective document and be written to cover a group of employees. Consequently, all its 
provisions are unlikely to apply to all employees or be exhaustive of the relationship 
between an individual employee and their employer. For this reason it would seem that 
an individual employee will need to be bound by a separate individual contract, which 
may be a minimal contract that merely specifies where the individual is fitted into the 
collective contract. The individual contract is also likely to be the vehicle which initiates 
the employment relationship that gives continuity of ~employment and to which the 
common law implied duties are attached. The collective contract will, however, spell out 
the principal te11ns of the employment relationship. 
Continuity of employment, and especially the teuns of the continuity, become 
particularly acute on the expiry of the collective contract. Section 19(4) provides that on 
the expiry of the collective contract ",each employee who continues in the employ of the 
employer shall ... be bound by an individual contract based on the expired collective 
employment contract." This provision does not provide explicitly for ~continuity of 
employment, the words "who continues in the employ of' being somewhat ambiguous, 
although continuity would seem to be envisaged. The more practical problem would 
seem to what is meant by "based on" the expired contract. The minimal interpretation 
would seem to be that all terms of the collective contract that applied directly to the 
individual at the time of the expiry would be carried forward. More problematic is those 
teuns that are for the benefit of the individual but which are collective in nature such as 
union access rights. Until these problems are resolved by litigation the most sensible 
approach would seem to be to express such rights as individual rights wherever possible. 
Thus an individual employee would hav~e the right to be visited by their union 
representative rather than, or as well as, the union having access rights to members. 
The law of contract and the Employment Contracts Act 
The aim of regulating employment relationship by the normal law of contract is at 
the heart of the reforms in the Act. In general te11ns that aim has been carried through 
into the legislation. Some problems do, however, r~emain to be addressed or clarified. 
The most obvious are those touching on the relationship between an individual contract 
and a collective contract, a situation not helped by the assumption made in drafting the 
Act that provisions in the Labour Relations Act applying to awards can appropriately be 
applied to collective contracts. In other areas the law of contract has been modified and 
discretionary powers vested in the Tribunal and C0urt may affect the strict te1 nas of a 
contract. It is not intended to discuss these issues in any detail and only the main issues 
will be noted. There are, however, significant technical problems raised by the Act 
(Harrison, 1991 ). 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal and Court In general the ordinary law of 
contract as it has been developed by the courts in e.mployment cases will govern 
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employment relationships. The Court's jurisdiction includes the ability "to hear any 
action founded on an employment contract" (s. 104{l){g)) and to make "any order that the 
High Court or a District Court may make under any ~enactment or rule of law relating to 
contracts" (s. 104{l){h)). There are, how~ever, 2 important restrictions on these powers. 
The first is that contained in section I 04(2) which provides that the Court shall make an 
order cancelling or varying a contract under subsection {l){h) "only if satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such an order should be made and that any other remedy would be 
inappropriate or inadequate." The reason the Court should be directed to apply a 
significantly higher requirement in cases involving employment contracts than that which 
the ordinary courts apply in other civil cases is difficult to understand and the rationale 
behind this provision ~escapes the author. 'This provision will affect the granting of the 
remedies provided in all the major acts affecting the general law of contract. 
The second provision is that both the Court and the Tribunal have jurisdiction to 
make decisions in "equity and good conscience" (s. 79(2) and 104(3)). The ~exercise of 
this power may not, however, be "inconsistent with this or any other Act or with any 
applicable employment contract." This provision has, under the previous legislation, 
given the Court a useful discretionary power (Hughes, 1989, para.9.150-155). The logic 
of the fo1 .1n of the provision, which seems to have been carried over from the Labour 
Relations Act with little thought, is now somewhat suspect. As the difference between a 
coUective contract and an individual contract may be so small as to be meaningless, the 
reason for excluding collective contracts but not individual contracts from the equity and 
good conscience provisions is not apparent. The fact that the Labour Relations Act 
contained a provision to exclude awards and agreements must be seen in the context that 
such documents were negotiated by an independent union and covered significant groups 
of workers. This is no longer the case. The difference between a collective contract and 
an individual contract under the new law may merely be that an employer has convinced a 
group of workers to sign a single standard fonn contract rather than have each individually 
sign their own copy of exactly the same contract. The fo11n of the limitation fails to 
adequately re.flect the change from awards to contracts and thought needs to be given to its 
appropriateness and to its fotna under the new Act. 
Harsh and oppressi·ve ~contracts A major substantive change to the law of 
contract that has been made by the Employment Contracts Act in section 57. The 2 
relevant parts of this section provide: 
57. Harsh and oppressive contracts- (1) Where any party to an e·mployment 
contract alleges-
(a) That the employment contrac~ or any part of i~ was procured by harsh 
and oppressive behaviour or by undue influence or duress; or 
(b) That the employment contrac~ or any part of it, was harsh or oppressive 
when it was entered into,-
that party may apply to the ~Court for an order under this section. 
(7) Except as provided in this section, the Court shall have no jurisdiction to 
set aside or modify, or grant relief in respect of, any employment contract under 
the law relating to unfair or unconscionable bargains. 
It would seem that these provisions may be of more use to employers attempting to 
challenge contracts concluded after a strike than to employees attempting to challenge 
either a collective contract, a point discussed above. An employee attempting to show 
that either behaviour or a tetrn of the contract were both harsh and oppressive would seem 
to face an extremely difficult hurdle. It is worth comparing this provision with the 
analogous provision in the Credit Contracts Act 1981. This Act allows the courts to re-
open a credit contract that is "oppressive" and oppressive is defined as meaning 
"oppressive, harsh, unjustly burdensome, unconscionable or in contravention of 
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reasonable standards of commercial practice" (s. 9). A similar provision in the 
Employment Contracts Act could allow some room to attack the more exploitadve 
contracts that are likely to flow from the changes to the law. Workers do, however, have 
some protection from oppressive conduct by employers through the personal grievance 
p1ocedure once employment has commenced. 
6. Conclusion 
The title of this article asked the question: is the Employment Contracts Act an 
employers' charter? The discussion above makes it clear that the Employment Conttacts 
Act has seriously eroded the collective rights of workers and consequently their ability to 
protect their individual interests in employment relationships. The Act ignores industrial 
relations experience in the great majority of countries that are comparable to New Zealand 
and instead relies on a dubious economic ideology based on unrealistic a priori 
assumptions, and which ignores features of real-world labour markets. It is already clear 
from news reports that employers are taking advantage of the lack of collective protection 
and the economic climate to force major reductions in wages and conditions and to 
attempt to de-unionize their workplaces. The predictable effect of the Act will be the 
development of a 3 tier labour market. Those workers who traditionally fell outside the 
scope of the Labour Relations Act will probably notice little change. If anything their 
position has been improved by the significant increase that they will gain in the security 
of their employment through access to the personal grievance procedure. Workers 
previously within the coverage of the Labour Relations Act will almost certainly divide 
into those petananent workers employed by larger employers, who are likely to retain 
their ability to negotiate collectively and to collectively protect their conditions, and 
those who work for smaller employers and who are in traditionally vulnerable groups. 
The latter group will become increasingly isolated and subject to the dictates of their 
employers. The most positive feature of the Labour Relations Act was that through the 
national award system it provided a basic level of protection to the most marginal and 
vulnerable groups of workers in the labour force. Such workers must now rely on the 
minimal protections provided by such statutes as the Minimum Wages Act 1983 and the 
Holidays Act 1981. To give a positive answer to the question posed above one need only 
consider the effect of the Act. 
What then of the future? It is clear that as a piece of legislation the Employment 
Contracts Act makes no attempt to balance the interests of workers and employers. It is 
a partisan piece of legislation which needs considerable change to become acceptable in a 
pluralist society. The Act does however form a base from which reforms can be 
mounted. The Labour Relations Act contained many features which needed reform and 
which had, perhaps, outlived their historical contexL Union monopoly bargaining rights 
and the consequent lack of choice for workers were one such feature. Another was the 
complex institutional arrangements surrounding the negotiation and regisbation of awards 
and agreements. That there was room for reform is clear. The issue was not the need but 
the fotnl, and it is the fo1n1 that must now be reconsidered. The Employment Contracts 
Act has 2 features that offer a base for future refotm. The decision to bring all conttacts 
of employment within the one system of law is a major advance. Equally important was 
the decision to retain the system of specialist labour tribunals that has served the country 
well over almost a century. The Employment Court has, in the past, shown the 
potential to develop a balanced approach to labour law and employment issues, an 
expertise that in general has been recognized by the Court of Appeal. If this trend 
continues, an autonomous labour law with roots in both the law of conttact and in the 
realities of industrial life, may develop enabling the law to escape from the worst aspects 
of the common law approach to the employment relationship. The development of a 
genuine and autonomous law of employment may then become possible (Wedderburn, 
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1987). For this to occur, however, the Employment Contmcts Act will need considemble 
reform. 
The first and most straightforward refo1111 is to re-examine the law of contract and 
ensure that it is adapted to the needs of labour law. This is not a novel exercise and 
indeed the Employment Contracts Act in requiring all contracts to contain a disputes and 
a personal grievance procedure has already commenced this process. Statutory refonn of 
contract law both generally and in specialist areas of the law is nothing new, and one need 
only consider the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 or the Credit Contracts Act 1981. A 
more difficult issue is how to refo1111 the provisions relating to the right to organize and 
for collective bargaining. Again this is not an insurmountable task. Clear international 
standards exist and there are many pfecedents. To adapt New Zealand law to these \./' 
standards requires not so much expertise, although that is invaluable, but a government 
that recognizes that a pluralist democratic society must accept that workers have these 
rights. Refouns to promote collective bargaining will not, however, necessarily be 
sufficient to protect the bottom tier in the labour market nor even the most appropriate 
method. Collective bargaining has been criticized for not adequately recognising the 
needs of marginal workers (Conaghan, 1986). Perhaps what may be needed is there-
development of the concept of a social state and within it a closer integration between 
such a social law and employment law. 
References 
Anderson, G. (1979) Jurisdiction under the Industrial Relations Act 1973: some problems 
and issues. W~ellington, Industrial Relations C~entre, Victoria Univ~ersity of Wellington 
(Occasional Paper No. 24). 
Anderson, G. (1987) The reception of the economic torts into New Zealand labour law: a 
preliminary discussion. New Zealand journal of industrial relations 12(2):89-100. 
Anderson, G. (1990) Developm~ents in the legal regulation of collective bargaining in 
New Zealand. Australian journal oflabour law 3(3):227-246. 
Brook, P. (1990) Freedom at work: the case for reforming labour law in New Zealand. 
Auckland, Oxford University Press. 
Brook, P. (1991) The Employment Contracts Act: two steps fonvard., one step back. 
Public sector 14(2):8-9. 
Brosnan, P., Smith, D. and Walsh, P. (1990) The dynamics of New Ze~aland industrial 
relations. Auckland, John Wiley. 
Conaghan, J. (1986) 'The invisibility of women in labour law: gender-neutrality in 
model-building. International journal of the sociology of law 14:377-392. 
Cooke, R. (1990) The dynamics of the common law. In Conference papers, 9t.h 
Commonwealth law conference, Auckland, Commerce Clearing House. 
Department of Labour (1985) Industrial relations: a framework for review. W~ellington, 
Government Printer. 
Downey, P. (1991) Work and contract. New Zealand law journal (May):145-146. 
Ewing, K. (1979) The golden formula: some recent dev~elopments. The industrial law 
journal ,8(3):133-146. 
Ewing, K. ( 1986) The right to strike. The industrial law journal 1 5(3): 14 3-160. 
Harrison, R (1991) The Employment Contracts Act 1991: some key legal issues. 
Auckland, Auckland District Law Society. 
142 Gordon Anderson 
Hayek, F. (1979) Law, legislation and liberty. London, Routledge Kegan and Paul 
(Volume 3). 
Hughes, J. (1989) Labour law in New Zealand. Sydney, Law Book Co. 
McAndrew, I. and Hursthouse, P. (1991) Reforming labour relations: what southern 
employers say. New Zealand journal of industrial relations 16(1): 1-11. 
Roth, H. (1986) .Legalised theft by deregistration. New Zealand journal of industrial 
relations 11(1):21-26. 
The Treasury (1990) Briefing to the incoming Government.. Wellington, The Treasury. 
Wedderburn, Lord (1986) The worker and the law. Hannondsworth, Penguin (3rd edition). 
Wedderburn, Lord (1987) Labour law: from here to autonomy? Industria/law journal 
16(1): 1-29. 
List of cases 
Ford Motor Co.v Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [1969] 2 Queen's Bench 
Reports 303. 
Re Andrew Patterson Ltd [1981] 2 New Zealand Law Reports 289. 
State Services Commission & B Lintas v Murphy [ 1986] 2 New Zealand Law Reports 
436. 
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation 
[1982] 2 All England Law Reports 67. 
